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Abstract  
In this paper, we investigate the potential threshold effects in the relationship between 
national expenditures on health care and national income. Using a panel threshold regression 
model, we derive country-specific and time-specific income elasticities for 17 OECD 
countries over the period 1975–2003. In contrast to many previous analyses, our empirical 
results show that health care is a necessity rather than a luxury. Further, the relationship 
between health expenditure and income seems rather nonlinear, changing over time and 
across countries. 
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1. Introduction 
It is well known that a significant relationship exists between national expenditures on health 
care and national income. Thirty years ago, Joseph Newhouse (1977) observed on the basis of 
an analysis of a cross-section of thirteen developed countries that over 90 percent of the 
variation between countries in per capita medical care expenditure could be explained by 
variations in per capita GDP. In an Engel curve context, this means that health care is a 
‘‘luxury’’ good. Afterwards, growing attention has been paid for the determinants of 
aggregate health care expenditure (Parkin et al., 1987; Gerdtham et al., 1992; Hitris and 
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Posnett, 1992; Hansen and King, 1996; Blomqvist and Carter, 1997; Di Matteo and Di 
Matteo, 1998; Okunade and Karakus, 2001; Clemente et al., 2004; Dregers and Reimers, 
2005; OECD, 2006; Tosetti and Moscone, 2007; Hartwig, 2008; etc.). Most estimates of the 
income elasticity of health care spending obtained, especially those derived from aggregative 
cross-section or time series data, exceed unity. But, as pointed by Blomqvist and Carter 
(1997) “the idea that health care spending should behave as a luxury good when aggregate 
data are used appears puzzling”.  In the same way, Clemente and al. (2004) argued that this 
finding seems counter-intuitive from an economic point of view.  
Two potential reasons can be advanced to explain why the demand for health care may 
mistakenly have an income elasticity in excess of unity. The first one is the potential non-
stationarity of the data. As explained by Jewel et al. (2003), when examining the relationship 
between health expenditures (HE) and GDP it is important to determine whether or not these 
two variables are stationary. Empirical tests that ignore this issue can lead to spurious 
regressions and meaningless results.  Recently, many studies, using both country-by-country 
and panel data techniques, have attempted to analyze the time series pattern of these two 
variables. (Mc-Coskey and Selden, 1998; Roberts, 1999; Gerdtham and Lothgren, 2000; 
Okunade and Karakus, 2001; Jewell et al., 2003; Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2005; Dreger and 
Reimers, 2005). Most of these found that HE and GDP are non-stationary (for example, 
Hansen and King, 1996; Blomqvist and Carter, 1997; Roberts (1999); Gerdtham and 
Lothgren, 2000). The second reason, which is specific to the panel data models, concerns 
cross-section heterogeneity. Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Hsiao (2003) have already 
indicated that ignorance of this issue causes biases to appear. Thus, in presence of 
heterogeneity, assuming a common elasticity of output with respect to health expenditure 
within international panels may be misleading. Hansen and King (1996) argued that cross-
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country data are characterised by strong heterogeneity that, if not properly incorporated in 
econometric models, could lead to the estimation of an income elasticity greater than one. 
One solution to deal with this heterogeneity problem is to specify a Panel Smooth Threshold 
Regression (PSTR) model, recently developed by Fok et al. (2004), González et al. (2005), 
Colletaz and Hurlin (2005) and Fouquau et al. (2008), which allows for smooth changes in 
country-specific correlations and cross-country heterogeneity and time instability of the 
elasticity. Such an approach is then suitable to capture both cross-country heterogeneity and 
time variability of the GDP-HE correlations2. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss the threshold 
specification of the determinants of health care expenditure. The choice of the threshold 
variable, linearity tests and estimates for the parameters are presented in section 3. The data 
and the results are presented in section 4, while the final section concludes. 
2. A PSTR model of health care expenditure 
Our ambition in this paper is to test whether or not health care expenditure is a luxury good. 
To address this question, we consider the following model: 
                           TtNicapitahe ititiit ,...,1     ,,...,1     ,. ==++= εβα                                   (1) 
where  and  denotes, respectively, the logarithm of real per-capita health 
expenditure and the logarithm of real per-capita income in the i
ithe itcapita
th country at time t, both 
expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP). iα  is an individual fixed effect, and itε  is the 
error term. As argued by Hitris and Posnett (1992), the use of health specific PPP to convert 
health spending provides a comparison of the real quantity of health care services purchased 
with given expenditure.  
                                                 
2 For more details and discussions on the utility of PSTR models, see, for example, Colletaz and Hurlin (2005) 
and Fouquau et al. (2008) 
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Nevertheless, this model suffers from two major problems. Firstly, many other factors, in 
addition to income, could affect health care expenditure. The share of the elderly, medical 
progress and relative prices are often mentioned to be the main non-income factors underlying 
health expenditure growth in the OECD countries. Many studies have previously found a 
positive and significant relationship between health care spending and the proportion of 
population over 65 (see for example Kleiman, 1974; Leu, 1986; Hitiris and Posnett, 1992, 
Felder et al., 2000). As highlighted by Hansen and King (1996), the elderly consume more 
health per capita than people of working age. Recently, the OECD (2006) points out that 
across all health expenditures types, expenditure on those aged over 65 is around four times 
higher than on those under 65. Further, between 1981 and 2002, average growth of public 
health spending was by 3.6% per year for OECD countries, of which 0.3% point was directly 
linked to demographic effects. On the other hand, Leu (1986) and Kleiman (1974) found a 
significant relationship between health expenditure and the proportion of population under 15. 
Kleiman (1974) reports a negative correlation between these two variables. He explained his 
result by the low per unit cost of the goods and services young people consume, such as 
vaccinations.  
Whatever the relationship between the population structure and health spending may be, 
population ageing is a common fact in developed countries. Progress in medical technology 
and treatment is advanced to be one of the most important determinants of health outcomes 
during the last century.  As suggested by Blomqvist and Carter (1997) and later by Tosetti and 
Moscone (2007), the rising of health care expenditure has been to a large extent driven by 
changes in technology and treatment. Newhouse (1992) and Wanless (2001) have already 
explained that technical progress causes a decrease of the relative price of health goods and 
services. If so, the more elastic is the demand for health care, the more increasing will be 
expenditures.  
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Another determinant of health care expenditure that has been identified by the literature is the 
share of public financing. In OECD countries, health care is mainly financed through public 
funds. Leu (1986) argued that the share of public financing increases health care expenditure 
to the extent that it reduces the price to the consumer. However, his argument is not 
confirmed by recent empirical studies. Gerdtham et al. (1992) and recently Tosetti and 
Moscone (2007) have found a negative relationship between the proportion of health care 
expenditure that is publicly funded and total health expenditure. 
Thus, given the potential interrelations between health care expenditure and these non-income 
factors, they should be included in the regression model as additional explanatory variables to 
check the robustness of the estimated income elasticity. But even in doing so, the problem is 
not resolved since the conditional relationship between income and health spending is always 
assumed homogeneous. In fact, equation (1) assumes the same income elasticity across the N 
countries of the panel, i.e. .,...,1, Nii =∀= ββ  Such an assumption is somewhat restrictive 
since there is substantial differences among OECD countries in the financing and organization 
of health services production, which may causes differences in the aggregate demand 
functions of health services (Clemente et al., 2004). 
Besides, equation (1) implies that the income elasticity is constant for the set time period of 
the model. This assumption seems to be misleading especially when dealing with large time 
dimension panels. Clemente and al. (2004) believe that it is too restrictive to assume an 
unchangeable relationship between health spending and the GDP for OECD countries. 
Usually, it is difficult to resolve heterogeneity and time variability problems simultaneously.  
But one issue proposed in the literature consists in introducing threshold effects in a linear 
panel model specification. Let us consider a Panel Smooth Threshold Regression (PSTR) 
model (Colletaz and Hurlin, 2005; Fouquau et al., 2008). Such a model assumes parameters to 
 5
change smoothly as a function of a threshold variable. In the case of two extreme regimes and 
one transition function, the model can be presented by3 : 
 
                                              ititititiit cqgcapitacapitahe εγββα +++= ),;(... 10                                 (2) 
The transition function is then given by : 
                                          0    ,
)].(exp[1
1),;( >−−+= γγγ cqcqg itit                                      (3) 
Thus, the income elasticity is defined as a weighted average of parameters 0β and 1β . For a 
given threshold variable, the elasticity of health care spending with respect to income for the 
ith country at time t is equal to: 
                    ),;(.10 cqgcapita
hee it
y
it γββ +=∂
∂= ,   with      (4) ⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ <≤≤+
>+≤≤
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0   if      
1010
1100
ββββ
ββββ
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Note that parameters 0β  and 1β  do not correspond to income elasticity. A positive (negative) 
value of 1β  simply indicates an increase (decrease) of the elasticity with the value of the 
threshold variable.  
3. Estimation and specification tests 
In a threshold model, there are two main problems of specification: the choice of the threshold 
variable and the determination of the number of regimes. Following Colletaz and Hurlin 
(2006) and Fouquau et al. (2008), we adopt a three-step procedure for estimating the final 
PSTR model. First, we test the linearity against the PSTR model. Then, if linearity is rejected, 
we determine the number of transition functions. Finally, we remove individual-specific 
means and then we apply non linear least squares to estimate the parameters of the 
transformed model. 
 
                                                 
3 Note that the PSTR model can be generalised to r + 1 extreme regimes as follows: 
 itjjitjit
r
j
jitiit cqgcapitacapitahe εγββα +++= ∑
=
),;(...
1
0
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3.1 Choice of the threshold variable 
What determines the size of the income elasticity? There are at least two factors which could 
affect the shape of the income/expenditure relationship: price variation and technological 
progress.  
As advanced by Baumol (1967), health sector is highly labor-intensive. Besides, it produces 
commodities for which the price elasticity is very low. Then, relying on this assumption, the 
relative price of these commodities tends to rise with income (Blomqvist and Carter,1997) 
and so does health expenditure. Clemente et al. (2004) consider that “with the price of health 
care growing faster than the average, health expenditure grows at a faster rate than income”. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Hartwig (2008), medical care price indices should not be used 
as explanatory variables, especially in cross-country studies, because, he reported, “price 
trends in health care must be expected to be as diverse as national schemes of price 
regulation”. Besides, Newhouse (1977) argued that price cannot be considered as a relevant 
determinant of health care spending in west countries because non-market rationing 
dominates. 
Another factor being thought to play a major role in determining the shape of the 
income/expenditure relationship is medical progress. Baumol (1993) believes that health care 
is “an industry whose costs are driven by technological imperatives to rapid rise”. Feldstein 
(1995) argues that “the rising cost of hospital care has been driven by changes in the 
technology or style or quality of care”. Although someone should expect technical progress to 
be cost-saving, in the sense that it reduces the relative price of health facilities and permits, 
consequently, a decrease in health expenditure4, it appears that such a proposal is to some 
extent unreliable. Many studies suggest that technical change has a strong cost-increasing 
effect in health care (see for example, Weisbrod, 1991; Blomqvist and Carter, 1997; Clemente 
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et al., 2004). Blomqvist and Carter (1997) explained that what is really purchased by 
individuals is ‘good health’, not health services. Then, “technical change takes the form of 
progress in our ability to transform health services into ‘good health’, rather than reducing the 
resource cost of producing health services”. The same idea has been developed by Clemente 
et al. (2004). They argue that individuals are increasingly interested in the quality of their life 
more than in the quantity of health care they consume. This explains why individuals devote 
an increasing fraction of their income to health services. The candidate for the threshold 
variable considered in this study is technical progress. Following Dreger and Reimers (2005), 
life expectancy is employed as a proxy, since data on medical technologies are incomplete. 
3.2. Linearity tests 
As explained by Fouquau et al. (2008), to test linearity in the PSTR model (equation 2) we 
replace the transition function ),;( cqg it γ by its first-order Taylor expansion around 0=γ . 
We then obtain an auxiliary regression:   
                                       ititititiit qcapitacapitahe εθθα +++= ... 10                                        (5) 
Thus, the linearity test consists of testing 0: 10 =θH . If linearity is rejected, a sequential 
approach is used to test the null hypothesis of no remaining nonlinearity in the transition 
function5. If we denote  the panel sum of squared residuals under (linear panel model 
with individual effects) and the panel sum of squared residuals under (PSTR model 
with two regimes), the corresponding F-statistic is then given by: 
0SSR 0H
1SSR 1H
                                               
( )[ ]
([ )]KNTNSSR
KSSRSSRLM F −−
−=
/
/
0
10                                          (6) 
                                                 
5 Testing for non remaining nonlinearity consists of checking whether there is one transition function 
( ) or whether there are at least two transition functions ( 1:0 =rH 2:1 =rH ). For more details, see Fouquau et 
al. (2008). 
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where K is the number of explanatory variables . Under the null hypothesis, the LM statistic is 
distributed as a and the F-statistic has an approximate 
distribution.  
)(2 Kχ
[ ]KrNTNKF )1(, +−−
4. Data and results 
The data set consists of a pooled sample of time-series and cross-section observations 
covering 176 OECD countries for the 29 years 1975-2003: a total of 493 observations. Some 
countries were excluded from the study because it was not possible to obtain detailed health 
care expenditure statistics starting from 1975. Our data are taken from OECD Health 
Database (2007) and World Development Indicators (WDI, 2005). 
In this study, we propose to estimate a multivariate regression model. Real per capita health 
expenditure (he) is modelled conditioned on real income per capita (capita), the share of the 
elderly (POP65), the proportion of population under 15 (POP15) and the share of public 
financing (PUB). The threshold variable chosen is life expectancy, as a proxy for technical 
progress. We begin the analysis by estimating the basic model proposed by Newhouse (model 
1). Then, we introduce new variables reflecting changes in population structure and 
institutional arrangements (model 2 and model 3).  
The econometric framework of our analysis is the following: 
(7)                                                    cqgcapitacapitahe: 1 Model ititititiit εγββα +++= ),;(... 10
 
[ ] ( ) (8)                                 CqgPOPcapita                                   
POPcapitahe2 Model
itjjitj
r
j
itjitj
ititiit
εγηβ
ηβα
+++
++=
∑
=
,;.65..
65..:
1
00
[ ] ( ) (9)               CqgPOPPUBcapita                                   
POPPUBcapitahe3 Model
itjjitj
r
j
itjitjitj
itititiit
εγλξβ
λξβα
++++
+++=
∑
=
,;.15...
15...:
1
000
 
                                                 
6 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
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The first step is to test the log-linear specification of the three models. The results of these 
linearity tests and specification tests of no remaining nonlinearity are reported on Table 1. As 
explained by Fouquau et al. (2008), the threshold variable may have a direct effect on the 
dependant variable. In this case, one could misleadingly find switching. To check this point 
we conduct a second test of non remaining linearity with direct effects in which the threshold 
variable is used as an explanatory variable. 
 
Table 1. Tests of linearity 
 LMF test for remaining linearity  
Specification Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Explicative variables Real capita Real capita, POP 65 Real capita, PUB, POP 15 
 
1:     vs.0: 10 == rHrH            131,153(0,00)                       31,142(0,00)                     65,058(0,00) 
 
2:    vs.1: 10 == rHrH            0,231(0,631)                         1,181(0,308)                       0,171(0,916) 
 
3:   vs.2: 10 == rHrH             -                                            -                                          - 
 
LMF test for remaining linearity with direct effects 
Specification Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Explicative variables Real capita Real capita, POP 65 Real capita, PUB, POP 15 
 
1:     vs.0: 10 == rHrH            8,493(0,00)                           12,833(0,00)                           25,523(0,00) 
 
Notes: The threshold variable is life expectancy. The corresponding LMF statistic has an asymptotic [ ]KrNTNKF )1(, +−−  
distribution under , where K is the number of explicative variables. The corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses. 0H
 
The linearity tests clearly lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of linearity for all three 
models, whether direct effects are considered or not. The strongest rejection of the null of 
linearity is obtained when model 1 is considered. This result implies that there is strong 
evidence that the relationship between health expenditure and income is non-linear. Thus, 
using a linear panel model in which income elasticity is assumed homogenous across 
countries may possibly lead to fallacious estimates, since the estimated elasticity could vary 
from a country to another. Besides, for a given country, it is possible that the shape of the 
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income/health expenditure relationship changes with time, in response to potential structural 
changes in financing schemes, health policies, economic conditions, etc. In this case, a linear 
approach which offers an average estimate of the different historical values of the income 
elasticity could hide information about the above structural changes. 
Table 1 gives also information about the optimal number of transition functions. The 
specification tests of no remaining nonlinearity lead to the identification of two extreme 
regimes (r = 1).  
Table 2. Parameters estimates for the final PSTR models 
Specification Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Explicative variables Real capita Real capita, POP 65 Real capita, PUB,  POP 15 
  
r*                                                     1                                           1                                          1 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Parameter 0β                                 0,82(0,08)                            0,8374(0,06)                       -4,7712(0,54) 
 
Parameter 1β                                 0,0961(0,01)                        0,0458(0,03)                       6,3131(0,59) 
 
Parameter 0η                                 -                                           0,3943(0,08)                       -   
 
Parameter 1η                                 -                                           -0,0334(0,12)                      - 
 
Parameter 0ξ                                 -                                           -                                          11,3795(1,12) 
 
Parameter 1ξ                                  -                                           -                                         -13,2138(1,31) 
 
Parameter 0λ                                 -                                           -                                        -0,4703(0,98) 
 
Parameter 1λ                                 -                                           -                                         0,1384(1,08) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Location parameters C                  4,3517                                 4,3354                               4,0317 
 
Slopes parameters γ                    23,5477                                52,8099                             6,6653 
 
Notes: The threshold variable is life expectancy. The standard errors for coefficients in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. The 
PSTR parameters can not be directly interpreted as elasticities. 
 
Table 2 reports the parameter estimates of the final PSTR models. As explained in section 2, 
the estimated parameters cannot be directly interpreted as elasticities. Let us consider the 
basic model (model 1). The parameter 1β is positive, which implies that when life expectancy 
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increases, income elasticity increases. In other words, with population being ageing, 
preference of households for health increases. Becoming more interested in the quality of 
their life, they will spend an increasing amount of revenue (savings) to purchase advanced 
health facilities.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 ye  σ  ye  σ  65pope σ  ye  σ  pube  σ  15pope σ  
Germany 0,853 (0,01) 0,854 (0,01) 0,382 (0,01) 0,730 (0,13) -0,136 (0,27) -0,350 (0,00)
Australia 0,862 (0,01) 0,862 (0,01) 0,376 (0,01) 0,811 (0,12) -0,305 (0,26) -0,348 (0,00)
Austria 0,852 (0,01) 0,854 (0,01) 0,382 (0,01) 0,717 (0,15) -0,108 (0,31) -0,350 (0,00)
Canada 0,864 (0,01) 0,865 (0,01) 0,374 (0,01) 0,838 (0,10) -0,361 (0,21) -0,347 (0,00)
Denmark 0,851 (0,01) 0,852 (0,01) 0,384 (0,01) 0,731 (0,06) -0,137 (0,13) -0,350 (0,00)
Spain 0,863 (0,01) 0,863 (0,01) 0,375 (0,01) 0,825 (0,10) -0,334 (0,20) -0,348 (0,00)
USA 0,851 (0,01) 0,852 (0,01) 0,384 (0,01) 0,726 (0,08) -0,126 (0,18) -0,350 (0,00)
Finland 0,852 (0,01) 0,853 (0,01) 0,383 (0,01) 0,724 (0,12) -0,121 (0,25) -0,350 (0,00)
Iceland 0,871 (0,01) 0,871 (0,01) 0,370 (0,01) 0,892 (0,07) -0,474 (0,15) -0,346 (0,00)
Japan 0,874 (0,01) 0,871 (0,01) 0,370 (0,01) 0,907 (0,11) -0,506 (0,22) -0,346 (0,00)
Norway 0,863 (0,01) 0,863 (0,01) 0,375 (0,01) 0,829 (0,07) -0,342 (0,14) -0,348 (0,00)
New-Zealand 0,853 (0,01) 0,855 (0,01) 0,382 (0,01) 0,735 (0,13) -0,146 (0,28) -0,350 (0,00)
Netherlands 0,862 (0,01) 0,863 (0,01) 0,376 (0,01) 0,823 (0,06) -0,329 (0,13) -0,348 (0,00)
UK 0,854 (0,01) 0,855 (0,01) 0,381 (0,01) 0,745 (0,11) -0,167 (0,23) -0,349 (0,00)
Sweden 0,867 (0,01) 0,867 (0,01) 0,373 (0,01) 0,863 (0,08) -0,414 (0,17) -0,347 (0,00)
Ireland 0,848 (0,01) 0,850 (0,01) 0,385 (0,01) 0,686 (0,12) -0,042 (0,26) -0,351 (0,00)
Portugal 0,845 (0,01) 0,849 (0,01) 0,386 (0,01) 0,642 (0,17) 0,050 (0,35) -0,352 (0,00)
All countries 0,858 (0,01) 0,859 (0,01) 0,379 (0,01) 0,778 (0,13) -0,235 (0,27) -0,349 (0,00)
Table 3. Income elasticities of health care spending: average of individual PSTR estimates.
 
Notes: For each country, the average, e , and standard deviation,  σ ,of the estimated elasticities are reported. The threshold variable is 
life expectancy. 
Given the parameters estimates of the final PSTR models, it is now possible to compute, for 
each country of the sample and for each date, the time varying elasticities of health care 
spending with respect to income ( ), the share of the elderly ( ), the proportion of 
population under 15 ( ) and public spending ( ). These smoothed individual 
elasticities are given by the formula (4). The average estimated elasticities are reported in 
Table 3 for the three PSTR models. These estimated elasticities are based on the historical 
values of the transition variable, life expectancy, observed for the 17 OECD countries.  
y
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As can be seen, the income elasticity of health care spending is below unity for all the 
countries of the sample whatever the model considered. This result contrasts with that found 
in previous studies: here, health care is not a luxury good. Some remarks can be driven from 
table 3. When considering models 1 and 2, the income elasticity does not considerably change 
from one country to another. But, when public spending is introduced as an explanatory 
variable (model 3), our results slightly change. Except for Iceland and Japan, the income 
elasticity is being lower. Tosettiy and Moscone (2007) found the same result arguing that 
introduction of public spending in the regression weakens the link between income and the 
standard of care. Another interesting finding is that coefficients are being different from one 
country to another, ranging from 0,642 in Portugal to 0,907 in Japan. This result obviously 
shows the heterogeneity of the income elasticity among OECD countries.  
Exhibiting cross-country heterogeneity is not the only advantage of a PSTR model. Such a 
specification permits in addition to study the time variability of the estimated income 
elasticities of health care spending. On the figure (1), the estimated elasticities  of health 
expenditure with respect to real income are plotted over the period 1975-2003 for the 17 
countries of our sample.  
y
ite
Plots have been done only for model 3 in order to capture as large as possible cross-country 
heterogeneity. Besides, we can observe from table 2 that for model 3 the estimated slope 
parameter γ  is relatively small. This implies that the transition between extreme regimes is 
smooth. But whatever the model considered, the finding is always the same: for all the 
countries, the estimated income elasticity is constantly increasing between 1975 and 2003. 
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Figure 1 : Estimated individual income elasticities 
 
Such a result sustains the proposal of a shift towards a growing and strongest relationship 
between health care spending and income in OECD countries. For nine countries of the 
sample (Germany, Austria, Spain, Finland, Norway, New-Zealand, Netherlands, United-
kingdom and Ireland), income elasticity is superior to 0,9 at the end of the period. For three 
countries (Australia, Canada and Sweden), this elasticity is around unity. For Japan and 
Iceland, it exceeds unity. What these results tell us? Is health care really becoming a luxury 
good? Recall that these estimated elasticities are based on the historical values of the 
transition variable, life expectancy, observed for the 17 OECD countries. So, one plausible 
response to the question above is that when society gets aged, i.e., life expectancy exceeds a 
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given threshold, the individual’s preferences shift towards health at the expense of 
consumption goods, and additional resources are required to enjoy a longer life. As 
technology of life extension is subject to “sharp diminishing returns” (Hall and Jones, 2005), 
a more than proportionate part of income will be needed in order to extend life. Accordingly, 
the more the people get richer, the more the share of resources they are willing to devote to 
health care increases. Of course, life expectancy is used in our PSTR model as a proxy for 
medical progress. Many previous studies have already pointed out that technical change is the 
main factor underlying health expenditure growth in the OECD countries. In our opinion, this 
purpose particularly matters in societies whose age pyramid dramatically switches in favour 
of the elderly.  To examine this, we have re-estimated our PSTR model by taking the share of 
the elderly as a threshold variable. Not surprisingly, we found an income elasticity well above 
unity7. From this point of view, the idea that health care is a luxury good, and that at the 
margin health care may contribute more to ‘caring’ than to ‘curing’ holds good.  
5. Conclusions 
Heterogeneity and nonlinearity can lead to biased results when trying to model the 
relationship between income and health care expenditure. If these two topics are not well 
incorporated in econometric models, it is likely that estimates misleadingly reveal an income 
elasticity greater than unity. Generally, it is difficult to resolve heterogeneity and nonlinearity 
problems simultaneously.  But one issue proposed in the literature consists in introducing 
threshold effects in a linear panel model specification. Smooth transition regression models 
are straightforward to deal with cross-country heterogeneity and time instability of the 
elasticities by allowing coefficients to vary across individuals and over time. 
In this paper we used a panel smooth transition regression model to estimate the relationship 
between income and health care expenditure for 17 OECD countries over the period 1975-
2003. In contrast to many previous studies, we show that, on average, the income elasticity of 
                                                 
7 These results have been omitted to conserve space, but are available from the author upon request. 
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health care spending is below unity for all the countries considered in the study. This finding 
is robust to the inclusion of other non-income determinants of health expenditure in the 
regression. But, in all likelihood, it seems that the shape of the income/expenditure 
relationship is changing over time, especially when introducing public health expenditure as 
an additional explanatory variable. Our estimates show that the income elasticity of health 
care spending is constantly increasing between 1975 and 2003. For fourteen countries, this 
elasticity grows to be close to unity at the end of the period. Questioning why the income 
elasticity increases over time, we have advanced the idea that when life expectancy exceeds a 
given threshold, the medical care needed by older people to enjoy longer life involves 
expansive technology and hospitalization. But, at this particular stage, health is directly 
affecting welfare and people are willing to purchase those expansive health care facilities as 
much as they afford it.  As the population get richer and older, the share of health expenditure 
in the total resources raises and the income elasticity is increasingly high that the proportion 
of the elderly increases.  
Finally, the main results of the paper can be summarized as follow: (i) the relationship 
between income and health care expenditure is nonlinear, (ii) on average the income elasticity 
of health care spending is below unity for the 17 OECD countries of the sample, (iii) the 
relationship between income and health spending is changing over time and across countries 
and, (iv) health expenditure seems to behave as a luxury good when life expectancy exceeds a 
critical threshold. 
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